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Over the last several years debate over monetary policy has focused on two issues, 
inflation targeting and asset price bubbles. This paper explores the case for explicitly 
targeting asset price bubbles, a policy that the Federal Reserve Bank has opposed on the 
grounds that it is both infeasible and undesirable. The paper argues that the Fed is wrong 
on both counts. Asset price bubbles are identifiable. Bubbles also do significant economic 
harm through the debt footprint effects they leave behind and through interest rate 
blunderbuss effects resulting from attempts to mitigate the aggregate demand impact of 
bubbles. Managing bubbles calls for additional policy instruments. These can be provided 
a system of asset based reserve requirements (ABRR).  
I   The policy debate over asset price bubbles   
Over the last several years debate over monetary policy has focused on two issues, inflation 
targeting and asset price bubbles. This paper explores the case for explicitly targeting asset price 
bubbles. 
Figure 1 describes the state of the debate at the Federal Reserve. The figure consists of a two-by-
two matrix in which the policy authority can be for or against explicit inflation targets, and for or 
against explicitly targeting asset price bubbles. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan 
Greenspan was explicitly against both formal inflation targets and targeting asset bubbles 
(Blustein, 2002; Greenspan, 2002a, 2002b). Current Fed Chairman Bernanke is on record as 
being in favor of formal inflation targets, but against targeting asset bubbles (Bernanke, 2002; 
Bernanke et al. 1999, 1997). 
  1The Greenspan – Bernanke opposition to targeting bubbles has two components. First, there is a 
pragmatic objection that targeting of bubbles is not feasible. Here the argument is that it is not 
possible to identify bubbles in advance. Moreover, even if they could be identified it would not 
be possible to safely pop them without exposing the economy to enormous collateral damage. 
Second, there is a theoretical objection against targeting bubbles which is that explicit targeting 
of asset market bubbles is not desirable. 
The paper argues that neither of these arguments holds up. With regard to the feasibility 
argument, stock market bubbles can be identified through ordinary measures such as stock 
market price/earnings ratios, while house price bubbles can be identified through measures as 
house price/income ratios and house price/rental ratios. Moreover, it is possible to control 
bubbles without imposing collateral damage. 
With regard to the theoretical objection, that too is unfounded. Contrary to the Federal Reserve’s 
thinking, asset bubbles distort economic activity and leave behind damaging effects that can 
reduce activity long afterward. This means policy needs to address and minimize their effects. 
Lastly, in making the case for targeting asset bubbles the paper does not recommend using 
interest rates, which is the conventionally assumed instrument for targeting bubbles. Using 
interest rates in this fashion imposes unacceptable collateral damage on the rest of the economy. 
Instead, the paper proposes adopting a new asset based reserve requirements (ABRR) regulatory 
framework that would give the monetary authority additional policy instruments. These 
instruments can then be specifically targeted on asset prices, thereby avoiding the collateral 
damage problem.  










  2II   The Fed’s economic model 
The Federal Reserve’s theoretical opposition to targeting asset price bubbles is based on its new 
theoretical model, which also guides its approach to inflation. Figure 2 provides a stylized 
representation of that new model. The core logic is that the level of aggregate demand (AD) 
drives fluctuations in the output gap, which in turn drive the rate of inflation and its deviation 
from target (be it explicit or implicit). The Fed then responds to these deviations according to its 
interest rate reaction function – a form of the so-called Taylor rule – and its interest rate response 
causes an adjustment of AD that brings output and inflation back in line with target. 
The important feature of the model is that asset prices are viewed as just one of many different 
factors influencing AD. Thus, in Figure 2, asset prices enter into the funnel of AD along with 
business and consumer confidence, global economic conditions, fiscal policy, exchange rates, 
and interest rates. According to this view, asset price bubbles are no more worthy of the Fed’s 
specific attention than is the state of business confidence. Just as the Fed would not try to target 
the state of confidence, nor should it try and target asset prices. Instead, it should watch and 
manage the overall level of AD, and asset prices are just one factor impacting AD. 
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  3The Fed’s view of the economy and its approach to stabilization policy can be captured by the 
following simple model. Output is determined by the level of AD and is given by 
(1) y = E(y, iL, PA,… )     Ey > 0, EiL < 0, EPA > 0 
where y = output, E(.) = AD function, iL = market loan rate, PA = price of assets. Equation (1) is 
the old Keynesian IS function in which AD depends positively on the level of income, negatively 
on the loan interest rate, and positively on asset prices. 
The market interest rate is determined in the financial sector according to 
(2) iL = iF + m   
where iF = federal funds rate, and m = bank interest rate mark-up. Equation (2) replaces the old 
Keynesian LM schedule and captures the reality of interest rate determination in a world of 
endogenous credit money in which the central bank sets the short-term money market rate. The 
mark-up reflects the liquidity preference of financial market institutions, and can be considered a 
catch all for the state of financial market confidence and attitudes toward and assessment of risk. 
The Fed chooses its federal funds target with the goal of hitting its output target, y
*. This 




*, m, PA,… )                                     diF
*/dy
* < 0,  diF
*/dm < 0, diF
*/dPA > 0 
The federal funds target is a negative function of the output target (y
*), a negative function of the 
financial sector’s mark-up (m), and a positive function of asset prices (PA) & other factors 
influencing AD.
1
The model is illustrated in Figure 3. A higher output target requires a lower federal funds rate 
because the monetary authority must bring down the market interest rate to increases AD. 
Likewise, a higher financial sector mark-up requires a lower federal funds rate. The reason is that 
to obtain the market interest rate needed to hit the output target the monetary authority must 
bring down the base cost of funds.  
                                                            
1 The output target can be interpreted as the full employment level of output or the level of output consistent with the 
Fed’s inflation target. 
  4Asset prices affect AD work through the common funnel described in Figure 2. Thus, a bubble 
induced increase in asset prices induces the Fed to raise its target funds rate in order to maintain 
AD at a level consistent with its output target. This situation is shown in Figure 4. After the 
bubble is over the Fed then lowers its target funds rate. The underlying logic is that economic 
conditions are smoothly reversible. Consequently, after a bubble the Fed can engineer a return to 
the initial equilibrium conditions. 



























  5III   Why the Fed’s model is wrong 
There are two problems with the Fed’s model as described above. The first is that it ignores debt 
“footprint” effects produced by bubbles. The second is that it ignores the “blunderbuss” effect of 
interest rate adjustments aimed at mitigating the AD effects of bubbles. Both of these effects 
have been visible in the recent U.S. house price bubble. 
Footprint effects refer to financial stock effects that linger after a bubble is done. Thus, asset 
price bubbles are usually fuelled by borrowing, and that borrowing leaves behind a debt footprint 
effect. When interest rates come down after bubble, past borrowing leaves behind debt burdens 
that can weigh down economy. The monetary authority may then be unable to adequately offset 
the AD effects of these burdens because of the zero nominal interest rate floor.  
Blunderbuss effects refer to the adverse impacts that increased interest rates have on sectors 
other than those affected by asset bubble. Thus, raising interest rates to counter a bubble can 
adversely change the composition of output, giving rise to negative long term effects. One 
problem is that higher interest rates may decrease investment spending, which in turn reduces 
future productivity and output. A second problem is that higher interest rates may appreciate the 
exchange rate, adversely impacting the trade balance and manufacturing. If the appreciation is 
prolonged, that can accelerate de-industrialization and increase the adjustment strains of 
globalization. Consequently, blunderbuss effects can have both short and long run impacts on 
manufacturing and growth. 
The working and impact of debt footprint and interest rate blunderbuss effects can be 
incorporated into a modified version of the Fed’s model. Now, the goods market is described 
shown by the following IS equation 
(3)  y = E(y, iL, PA, B, D-1,…)           Ey > 0, EiL < 0, EPA > 0, EB > 0, ED < 0 
where B = this period borrowing, and D-1 = last period’s debt stock. The current flow of 
borrowing has a positive impact on AD, while last period’s debt stock has a negative impact. It is 
this debt stock that gives rise to debt footprint effects. 
  6Additionally, aggregate demand is decomposed into consumption, investment, net exports, and 
government spending as follows: 
(4) E = C(y, iL, PA, B, D-1, … ) + I(iL, B, e(iL)) + NX(C(.), e(iL))  + G       
                          Cy > 0, CiL < 0, CPA > 0, CB > 0, CD < 0, IiL < 0, NXC < 0, NXe < 0, eiL > 0  
where C = consumption, I = investment, NX = net exports, G = government spending, e = 
exchange rate (FX/$), -1 = last period level. Investment spending is a negative function of the 
interest rate, the level of debt, and the exchange rate.
2 Likewise, net exports are also affected by 
the interest rate. A higher interest rate appreciates the exchange rate, which lowers net exports. 
However, a higher interest rate reduces consumption, which increases net exports. The 
conventional assumption, which is also assumed here, is that a higher interest rate has a net 
negative impact on net exports. 
The financial sector is described as follows: 
(6) iL = iF + m(D-1,..)               mD > 0 
(7) D = D-1+ B(dPA,…)         BdPA > 0 
(8) PA = PA-1 + dPA 
where dPA = change in asset prices. Equation (6) determines the market loan rate as a mark-up 
over the federal funds rate, but now the mark-up is a positive function of the debt stock. Equation 
(7) determines the evolution of the debt stock, which is equal to last period’s debt plus this 
period’s borrowing. This period’s borrowing is a positive function of the change in asset prices. 
Equation (8) determines the evolution of asset prices, with the term dPA capturing the effect of a 
bubble. 
The Federal Reserve sets the federal funds rate, which is determined as follows 
(9) iF = iF
* 
                                                            
2 In principle one could distinguish between household and corporate debt, but that would then introduce multiple 
interest rates making. The exchange rate negatively impacts investment by increasing import competition that 
reduces profitability.  
  7(10) iF
* = E
-1(y
*, PA, B(dPA), D-1, … ) > 0 
Thus, the Fed sets the funds rate with an eye to hitting its output target. The funds rate is affected 
by asset price bubbles through their impact on borrowing and AD. Confronted by a bubble that 
increases AD, the Fed raises the funds rate to neutralize the bubble’s AD impact. 
The blunderbuss effect of interest rate policy operates via equation (5). An asset price bubble 
increases AD, causing the Fed to raise rates. This has a negative impact on investment spending, 
and it also appreciates the exchange rate and has a negative effect on net exports. Such effects 
have been very present in the most recent U.S. economic expansion. Thus, as the Fed gradually 
raised interest rates to try and slow the house price bubble and construction boom, this 
contributed to a strong dollar, record trade deficits, and weak investment spending. 
The footprint effect works through both goods markets and the financial sector. Asset price 
bubbles increase consumption spending via the wealth effect and via increased borrowing. 
Increased borrowing raises debt, which then creates a debt footprint effect. The following period 
when the bubble dies down the economy is left with a debt footprint that exerts a direct drag on 
spending in the goods market. Additionally, the increase in debt causes financial institutions to 
increase their credit mark-up, widening the spread between the federal funds rate and the market 
loan rate. The net result is AD contracts directly, and the market interest rate rises yielding a 
negative indirect effect on AD. Both types of effect have been visible in the wake of the bursting 
of the house price bubble. 
From a policy perspective the danger is that the economy may get stuck in a post-bubble trap, 
such as is illustrated in Figure 5. The source of the problem is the zero bound to the nominal 
federal funds rate. Thus, given post-bubble depressed AD conditions and higher interest rate 
mark-ups, the monetary authority may not be able to push its policy interest rate to a level 
sufficiently low to achieve its real output target. 















Moreover, pushing interest rates down to artificial lows can have reverse blunderbuss effects. 
Thus, just as raising the interest rate distorted the composition of economic activity, so too can 
excessively lowering it. In particular, this can produce exchange rate depreciation that causes 
imported inflation and lowers living standards by worsening the terms of trade. It may also 
encourage renewed speculation in land purchases, storage activities, and long-lived activities that 
are sensitive to interest rates. 
Lastly, in addition to a post-bubble trap, there may also be post-bubble capacity effects. One 
effect already noted is the potential destruction of manufacturing and tradable goods production 
capacity during the course of the bubble. A second effect, emphasized by Bernanke (1983), is the 
potential for destruction of financial capacity when the bubble deflates. Thus, deflation of a 
bubble combined with ensuing income contraction may trigger bankruptcies, which in turn cause 
banks and financial intermediaries to fail. This process of destruction of financial sector capacity 
combined with the destruction of the credit-worthiness of borrowers may disrupt the normal 
provision of credit. That can produce an outcome analogous to prolonged credit rationing in 
which only the only very best and most connected customers get credit. Consequently, both 
aggregate supply and aggregate demand may contract, leaving the economy stuck far below 
“normal” potential output. 
  9IV   Asset bubbles and the policy instrument problem 
The above analysis shows that monetary authorities need to be able to respond to asset price 
bubbles – especially in real estate. However, responding with higher interest rates gives rise to 
the blunderbuss effect, and that points to need for additional policy instruments to target bubbles. 
Such additional instruments can be provided via a system of asset based reserve requirements 
(ABRR) such as has been suggested by Palley (2000, 2003, 2004) 
Under a system of ABRR financial intermediaries hold reserves against their assets. The reserve 
requirement for each asset category is adjustable and set at the discretion of the monetary 
authority, and asset categories can be zero-rated. Moreover, to prevent regulatory arbitrage and 
avoid unfair competitive distortions, a system of ABRR should be applied to all financial 
intermediaries. In effect, financial intermediaries should be regulated on the basis of “function” 
and not “form”, thereby ensuring a level playing field for similar businesses regardless of the 
form firms choose to take.
3  
Given n different asset categories, such a regulatory system creates n – 1 additional policy 
instruments. The logic is as follows. Let ij denote the equilibrium interest rate on the jth asset 
category. Without a system of ABRR the interest rate on this type of asset is 
(8) ij = iF + mj(.) 
where  mj(.) = mark-up required by financial firms for holding assets of type j. Now, suppose 
assets in the jth category are subject to a per dollar reserve requirement of kj. In that event, the 
required interest rate will adjust to 
(9) ij = [1 + kj]iF + mj(.)                                       j = 1,…,n 
The logic is that because financial firms have to hold reserves of kj they will require a higher 
return to compensate for the holding cost of those reserves. 
                                                            
3 The need for uniform regulation of the financial system based on function and not form is emphasized by D’Arista 
and Schlesinger (1993). They presciently foresaw that the development of an unregulated parallel banking would 
lead to the type of credit excesses witnessed in the US house price bubble and mortgage crisis.  
  10More generally, imposing reserve requirements on asset holdings creates a wedge between the 
interest rate on the asset class and the monetary authority’s policy interest rate (which in the U.S. 
is the federal funds rate). The monetary authority can adjust the size of this wedge by varying the 
reserve requirement, and in doing so can change relative returns across asset classes. That gives 
it n – 1 extra policy instruments whereby it can change relative interest rates on assets, and 
thereby influence portfolio and lending allocations. 
The comparative logic of ABRR is illustrated in Figure 6, which shows the different economic 
logic embedded in different systems of balance sheet regulation. The first system is liability 
based reserve requirements (LBRR), which is the conventional way of regulating banking 
systems. Under LBRR banks hold reserves (an asset) against deposits (a liability), so that the 
direction of causation flows from the liability side of the balance sheet to the asset side. When 
banks take on additional deposit liabilities they must hold additional reserves. 
The second form of balance sheet regulation is risk based capital standards, which is the current 
preferred form of regulation. Under this system assets are categorized by riskiness, and banks 
must hold more equity capital (a balance sheet liability) against more risky assets. Thus, 
causation runs from the asset side of the balance sheet to the liability side. When banks take on 
additional risky assets they must hold more equity capital. 
Figure 6. Comparisonof different formsof balance sheet 
regulation
(1) Liabilities----------Æ-------------------Assets
[LBRR = Reserves on deposits, collateral/margin requirements]
(2) Assets ------------Æ----------------- Liabilities
[Risk based capital standards]
(3) Liabilities---------Æ-----------------Liabilities
[Debt-to-equity requirements]
(4) Assets ------------Æ------------------- Assets
[ABRR]
 
  11The third form of balance sheet regulation is debt-to-equity standards. Both debt and equity are 
balance sheet liabilities, so that causation runs between liability categories. If financial firms take 
on more debt, they must hold more equity. 
The fourth and final form of balance sheet regulation is asset based reserve requirements. Under 
this system firms must hold reserves (an asset) against other assets. Thus, if firms expand the 
assets they hold, they must also increase their reserve holdings. Causation is therefore contained 
within the asset side of the balance sheet, and runs from assets to assets. 
Lastly, ABRR have some similarities with margin requirements, and they can therefore be easily 
misunderstood as equivalent. That is wrong, and there are significant differences. One difference 
is that ABRR would be levied against lenders, whereas stock market margin requirements are 
levied against borrowers who borrow to buy stock. A second key difference is that ABRR are 
counter-cyclical, whereas margin requirements can be pro-cyclical and create instability. Thus, if 
asset prices fall, margin requirements generate margin calls that oblige lenders to post additional 
collateral. That demand furthers stresses the system at a time it is already stressed, and if 
borrowers are unable to meet the call their holdings may be sold which further depresses asset 
prices. In contrast, under a system of ABRR the decline is asset prices will free up reserves, as 
required reserve holdings are based on the market value of the asset.  
V   Advantages of ABRR 
A system of ABRR has numerous advantages. First, ABRR enable the monetary authority to 
affect the relative cost of different asset categories while holding the policy interest rate constant. 
That provides monetary authorities with a precision instrument for influencing portfolio and 
lending allocations. For instance, if a monetary authority wanted to dampen a property bubble, it 
could impose reserve requirements on new mortgages. That would raise the cost of mortgages 
without raising the general level of interest rates, so that the bubble would be targeted without 
imposing interest rate blunderbuss effects on the rest of the economy. 
Second, as identified by Thurow (1972) and Pollin (1993) ABRR can be used to direct 
investment finance to neglected socially deserving areas. For instance, if policymakers want to 
  12address problems of inner-city decline, they could impose negative reserve requirements on 
loans made for purposes of inner-city development. In effect, the central bank would subsidize 
such loans by lending reserves interest free to banks making such socially approved loans. 
Third, ABRR have good counter-cyclical properties that render them a form of automatic 
stabilizer. The reserves held against an asset are calculated on the basis of the asset’s value. That 
means when asset prices increase, as they do in booms, financial firms need to increase their 
reserve holdings, thereby exercising a brake on the boom. The reverse holds for economic 
contractions. Thus, when asset prices fall as has been happening recently in the mortgage backed 
securities market, this automatically frees up reserves and liquidity. 
A fourth benefit is the seignorage that accrues to the central bank as a result of financial firms 
holding non-interest reserves issued by the central bank. A fifth and related benefit, is that 
ABRR re-build the demand for reserves issued by the central bank. This stands to strengthen 
monetary policy transmission mechanism that has been eroded in recent years by the relative 
decline of banks compared to other financial intermediaries (Friedman, 1999). 
Of particular interest are the relative merits of ABRR compared to risk based capital standards 
(RBCS), which is the system of regulation currently advocated by central banks. A first 
important strength of ABRR is that they promote counter-cyclical adjustment, whereas RBCS 
are pro-cyclical. In financial downturns ABRR release reserves as asset prices fall, and they 
increase demand for reserves as asset prices rise. In contrast, RBCS force firms to raise more 
equity as assets deteriorate in quality, and that can be difficult during downturns. Consequently, 
RBCS can exacerbate credit crises. Indeed, to preserve capital financial firms may cut back on 
financing riskier activities during downturns. This impacts that part of financial markets most 
impacted by downturns amplifies the downturn, and the 2007-08 US mortgage crisis seems to 
provide evidence for this pattern of behavior.  
A second advantage of ABRR is that it can be used as a tool of discretionary monetary policy 
since the monetary authority can easily adjust reserve requirements in accordance with market 
conditions. That gives the monetary authority a tool for targeting particular asset categories that 
may be subject to asset price bubbles. Additionally, ABRR can serve some of the same functions 
as RBCS to the extent that the discretionary reserve requirement takes into account the riskiness 
  13of asset classes. Thus, if the monetary authority wants to discourage holdings of a particularly 
risky asset class, it can raise the reserve requirement on that class. RBCS are less suitable for this 
type of discretionary policy since it is costly for firms to raise equity capital, and it can be 
especially costly and difficult to do so in economic downturns and times of financial stress. 
A third advantage of ABRR relative to RBCS is that the former confer seignorage benefits, 
whereas RBCS do not. Additionally, ABRR strengthen the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism by increasing demand for the liabilities of the central bank, while RBCS do not.  
This said, in principle, the two systems of regulation can even be combined. Thus, RBCS can be 
use to discourage excessive risk-taking by ensuring that financial firms have “some skin in the 
game”, while ABRR can be used to assist monetary policy and target specific asset market 
problems. 
VI   Government bonds as the reserve asset 
The reserve asset in a system of ABRR is usually thought to be the liabilities of the central bank. 
However, an alternative possibility is to use government bonds as the reserve asset. This has both 
advantages and disadvantages.  
Bonds are flex-price financial assets whose price adjusts in response to changes in market 
interest rate conditions. Higher interest rates reduce the value of bond holdings, and if the value 
of firms other assets are unchanged that would require firms to hold additional bonds. The 
reverse would hold when market interest rates fall. 
On the advantage side, this response of bond prices would provide an automatic stabilizer. Thus, 
when the economy started to boom or when inflation increased, interest rates would tend to rise 
and bond prices fall. This would automatically cause financial firms to have to allocate resources 




4 Purchasing additional bonds would tend to drive up bond prices, which would mitigate the automatic stabilizer 
effect, but the net effect would still be stabilizing. 
  14On the disadvantage side, fluctuations in interest rates would tend to create uncertainty for 
financial firms. Additionally, to the extent that bond market interest rates move perversely or do 
not respond to the business cycle, this would limit the automatic stabilizer property. 
Finally, with regard to public finances, using government bonds as the reserve asset would 
increase demand for bonds, which would facilitate budget deficit financing and lower debt 
servicing costs. Balanced against this, the central bank would lose the seignorage from having its 
liabilities serve as the reserve asset. 
VII   ABRR and the euro zone 
ABRR have particular relevance for the euro zone and the European Central bank (ECB). The 
establishment of the euro represents an important step in the creation of an integrated European 
economy. Over time it should yield dividends as increased competition and lower transaction 
costs generate increased efficiency. However, member countries have had to give up their own 
exchange rates and interest rates, which has created problems for economic management by 
reducing the number of policy instruments. In particular, the ECB must wrestle with how to set 
interest rates when some countries are booming, while others suffer high unemployment.  
ABRR can help fill this policy instrument gap. This is because the ABRR can be implemented 
on a geographic basis by varying reserve requirements across countries. Real estate lending, 
which has been a major concern, is particularly suited to this. Thus, if Spain and Ireland are 
suffering excessive house price inflation, the ECB could raise reserve requirements on mortgage 
loans secured by property in those countries. That would quickly raise mortgage loan rates in 
Spain and Ireland without raising rates in other countries. 
Geographically contingent ABRR will create incentives to shop for credit across countries. That 
means ABRR with a geographic dimension will work best when linked to geographically 
specific assets that cannot escape. This includes mortgage lending that is secured by 
collateralized property, and shares for which legal title is registered where companies are 
incorporated. But jurisdictional shopping is expensive, and that itself is a cost that can allow 
ABRR to create cross-country interest rate differentials for wide categories of assets. 
  15Additionally, jurisdictional shopping would tend to promote cross-country financial integration, 
which is a long-term goal of the euro project. So even here there is an upside.  
One possible problem is that a system of ABRR might raise political conflicts between the ECB 
and member countries. For instance, if the ECB chose to raise ABRR in just one country (say 
Spain because of its housing boom), that could evoke an adverse political response in that 
country. This suggests a dual system of ABRR operating at both the pan-European and national 
levels. Pan-European policy would be controlled by the ECB, which would have the power to set 
ABRR across the euro zone with common requirements in all countries. However, individual 
country central banks would have the right to set country specific asset reserve requirement 
ratios, subject to the proviso that they be no lower than the requirement ratio set by the ECB. 
This would give countries the power to set monetary policy that was tighter than that set by the 
ECB, but not looser. 
VIII  Conclusion 
In recent years monetary policy debate has focused on inflation targeting and whether monetary 
authorities should intervene to deal with asset price bubbles. Both former Federal Reserve 
Chairman Alan Greenspan and current Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke are on record as 
being against targeting bubbles. 
This paper has argued that their view is mistaken. Asset price bubbles can be identified, and they 
are economically destructive. That was shown by the earlier deflation of Japan’s real estate 
bubble, and it is being shown again with the deflation of the U.S. house price bubble. That means 
policy should address them. However, having said this, the paper is against using the monetary 
authority’s policy interest rate to target bubbles as that imposes unacceptable collateral damage. 
Instead, the paper recommends adopting a system of ABRR that can provide additional policy 
instruments that enable targeting of asset markets without raising the general level of interest 
rates. 
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